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1. In this paper I shall make an attempt at tracing one particu-
lar path Georg Henrik von Wright travelled in the realm of 
values and moral philosophy.* More precisely, I shall have a 
look at some of von Wright’s discussions concerning the con-
cept of ‘the good of man’ – a notion of which von Wright 
himself states at the beginning of the fifth chapter of his 1963 
The Varieties of Goodness (henceforth also Varieties or VoG), 
that it “is the central notion of our whole inquiry”, and that 
“the problems connected with it are of the utmost difficulty” 
(VoG, 86). He continues: “Many of the things which I say 
about them may well be wrong. Perhaps the best I can hope 
for is that what I say will be interesting enough to be worth a 
refutation.” 
Von Wright’s discussion on the good of man in the Varie-
ties has not escaped external criticism,1 but von Wright him-
self also later grew dissatisfied with his earlier account and 
                                               
* I would like to thank Anita von Wright-Grönberg and Benedict von 
Wright for permission to quote from Georg Henrik von Wright’s un-
published scientific correspondence and the two anonymous reviewers 
for their incisive comments on the content of this paper. I am also grateful 
to Erich Ammereller, Peter Hacker, Lars Hertzberg, Georg Meggle and 
Bernt Österman, who all read the penultimate draft of this paper and pro-
vided me with comments and encouragement. Robert Whiting deserves 
special thanks for brushing up my English.  
1 Both Thomas Schwartz’s (1989) and Kurt Baier’s (1989) contributions in 
the volume of Library of Living Philosophers dedicated to von Wright’s phi-
losophy take a critical stance on the account von Wright gives of this con-
cept in the Varieties.  
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adopted different strategies in dealing with this central no-
tion. As in many other instances, he was himself one of the 
fiercest critics of his own thinking. As I shall try to show in 
this contribution, his understanding of the concept of ‘the 
good of man’ went through a decisive change during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The crucial point of this change was 
the abandonment of an ultimately subjectivist account of what 
the good of man consists of in favour of a more objectivist 
and balanced conception of human welfare. In tracing this 
development, we shall do well to start our journey from The 
Varieties of Goodness. 
 
2. Why and in what sense is the good of man such a central 
notion in the conceptual framework von Wright suggests in 
his Varieties of Goodness? As any reader of this book probably 
knows, the treatise is primarily an analytical discussion on 
the various forms, or varieties, of goodness, or – as von 
Wright occasionally prefers2 – of different uses of the word 
‘good’. In the broad conceptual framework discussed and 
analysed in the book, the concept of ‘the good of man’ turns 
out to be just an interesting sub-form of a more general vari-
ety of goodness that von Wright calls ‘the good of a being’. 
Thus, the great importance of this concept is not to be ac-
counted in terms of its generality or in terms of its conceptual 
priority in relation to the other forms.3 Rather, it seems, its 
significance consists in the central position the concept takes 
in von Wright’s conception of ethics and moral philosophy. 
In the sixth chapter of the Varieties, subtitled ‘Good and 
Action’, von Wright presents his reader some tentative at-
tempts at defining the concept of moral goodness. These sug-
gestions are in fact attempts to articulate (or mould) the 
concept of moral goodness in a particular fashion – one could 
                                               
2 See e.g. VoG, 8.  
3 See, however, David Wiggins (2009). He proposes that ’the good of man’ 
could be taken as a concept in terms of which one can try to give an ac-
count of the other forms of goodness. The approach suggested by Wiggins 
is an independent development on the basis of von Wright’s ideas, but 
not a strategy von Wright himself adopts. In fact, one of von Wright’s 
basic philosophical ideas in the Varieties seems to have been than none of 
the varieties are conceptually prior to one another. See the somewhat 
aporetic discussion of the meaning pattern of the varieties in VoG, 12–18.  
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say that they are suggestions for adopting particular criteria 
and rules for the use of the expression ‘morally good’.4 And it 
is precisely these suggestions that seem to account for the cen-
tral position von Wright reserves for the concept of ‘the good 
of man’. In order to understand how, let us now have a brief 
look at one of von Wright’s proposed explications of moral 
goodness: 
[A]n act is morally good, if and only if it does good to at least 
one being and does not do bad (harm) to any being; and  
an act is morally bad, if and only if it does bad (harm) to at least 
one being. (VoG, 121). 
In this proposed definition, von Wright suggests an account 
of moral goodness (/badness) as a predicate of acts in terms 
of another form of goodness, discussed earlier in Chapter III 
of the book: the beneficial (or harmful). The beneficial in turn 
is a sub-form of what von Wright calls utilitarian goodness 
and is intimately related to the idea of the good of a being 
(see VoG, 40–48). According to von Wright, some x is good in 
the utilitarian sense, if x (causally) promotes some end or 
purpose, or, simply, if x is useful: a good plan or a good piece 
of advice are examples of utilitarian goodness. Again, some x 
is beneficial, if the end or purpose that x causally promotes is 
some being’s good, i.e. if x does good to some being: water 
does good (is beneficial) to a lemon tree, as do insightful dis-
cussions to a philosopher. 
In this context we have limited resources to discuss von 
Wright’s proposed explication of the concept of moral good-
ness and its philosophical background.5 I wanted to highlight 
this definition only in order to show how the concept of ‘the 
good of a being’ – and especially ‘the good of man’ – is in-
deed the very central notion in von Wright’s understanding 
of moral value. According to the position suggested, to make 
judgment on the moral value of an act is to evaluate how the 
                                               
4 This approach is intimately related to von Wright’s idea that basic con-
cepts of ethics are concepts ‘in search of a meaning’ and that the philoso-
pher may ‘mould’ the concept by suggesting some particular standards 
for the use of the expressions (see VoG, 4–6). 
5 I have, however, dealt with some aspects of this background in another 
context, see Jakola (2014).  
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act in question causally promotes (or protects) the good of 
some being (or in the plural: beings), or alternatively: its 
(their) welfare or happiness. This basic idea seems to have 
remained at the very core of von Wright’s reflections on mo-
rality to the very end of his life. 
 
3. Let us now have a closer look at von Wright’s reflections on 
the good of man. Chapter V of The Varieties of Goodness is 
wholly devoted to this concept, but the discussion is closely 
connected with the remarks on the more general notion of 
‘the good of a being’ in Chapter III.6 and III.12. We shall thus 
do well to have a brief look at von Wright’s treatment of the 
latter concept first. 
The notion of ‘the good of a being’ stands out among the 
other varieties of goodness discussed in the book in one spe-
cial respect. All the other main varieties – i.e. instrumental, 
technical, hedonic, utilitarian and medical goodness – are dif-
ferent forms of goodness as an attribute: that is, they are logi-
cally different uses of the word ‘good’ in compounds of the 
form ‘good x’. In this respect the concept of ‘the good of a 
being’ is different. It does not so much designate goodness in 
the sense of some being or thing being good, but rather a good 
some being has or enjoys, or a good (state) a being is in. Fur-
thermore, we, as human beings, may have a conception of our 
good, and we may in turn pursue or strive for this good. ‘The 
good of x’ is thus an example of the use of the word ‘good’ as 
a substantive. The German equivalent mentioned by von 
Wright for this form is ‘das Wohl’.6 
According to von Wright, the beings that have a good are, 
primarily and foremost, living beings, and only secondarily – 
and metaphorically – artefacts, parts of living beings, or social 
units. In fact, von Wright suggests that the good of a being, 
and the attributes that go along with it, is a biological concept 
in a broad sense – for it is primarily applicable to beings that 
have a life. Obviously, different kinds of living beings may 
also have different goods.7 
 
                                               
6 See VoG, 10 and 86. 
7 See the discussion in VoG, 50–51 and 61–62. 
In Search of ‘the Good of Man’   273 
 
4. von Wright’s discussion on the good of man in Chapter V 
falls roughly in three sections. The first, introductory section 
V.1, consists of a preliminary discussion of partial synonyms 
for the expression ‘the good of man’: Well-being, doing well, 
being healthy, flourishing, thriving, prospering, happiness 
and welfare are all mentioned as partial synonyms, but three 
main candidates seem to stand out: well-being, happiness 
and welfare. (VoG, 86–87). 
The first main candidate, the concept of well-being, is 
given a fairly quick treatment, and von Wright does not re-
turn to it later. He connects this concept with the basic pre-
requisites of the good of man, and relates it to medical 
concepts such as health and illness. He writes: 
The notion of being well is related to the notion of health. Often 
‘to be well’ means exactly the same as ‘to be in good, bodily and 
mental, health’. A man is said to be well when he is all right, fit, 
in good shape generally. These various expressions may be said 
to refer to the minimum requirements of enjoying one’s good. 
(VoG, 86). 
Even though von Wright does not state this explicitly in this 
context, the upshot of connecting well-being with the mini-
mum requirements of the good of man seems to be that well-
being is, in a sense, a privative notion: it is connected to things 
without which beings would suffer and not be able to pursue 
their (higher) goals. This kind of basic or privative dimension 
of the good of man is, as von Wright states in another context, 
again closely related to the (basic) needs and wants of living 
beings. (VoG, 62). 
It is, however, not well-being but happiness and welfare 
that von Wright seems to consider the closest and most im-
portant candidates for the synonym of the expression ‘the 
good of man’. In fact, the rest of Chapter V consists of a thor-
ough and minute examination of these two concepts. 
According to von Wright, even though the expressions 
‘happiness’ and ‘welfare’ are sometimes used synonymously, 
there are some important conceptual differences between 
them, and they thus belong to different “logical categories”. 
The most important difference is that happiness has a logical 
affinity with hedonic concepts, whereas welfare is more 
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closely related to utilitarian concepts. (VoG, 87–88.)8 That is: 
they are related to two different (main) forms of goodness.9 In 
von Wright’s words,  
Happiness is allied to pleasure, and therewith to such notions as 
those of enjoyment, gladness and liking. (…) Welfare, again, is 
primarily a matter of things beneficial and harmful i.e. good and 
bad, for the being concerned. As happiness, through pleasure, is 
related to that which a man enjoys and likes, in a similar manner 
welfare, through the beneficial, is connected with that which a 
man wants and needs. (VoG, 87). 
On the basis of this (and some other considerations) von 
Wright claims that welfare is a more comprehensive and ba-
sic notion than happiness. It covers the whole of what we call 
‘the good of man’ – allegedly also including the wants and 
needs of beings that von Wright connected earlier with the 
concept of well-being.10 Happiness, on the other hand, is, ac-
cording to this position, a more restricted notion, which cen-
tres on the idea of a subject enjoying his life as a whole, or 
alternatively, of prospering or thriving in his life. Using 
metaphorical expressions, von Wright calls happiness the 
“consummation, or crown or flower” of welfare. (VoG, 88.) 
Thus the outcome of von Wright’s preliminary discussion is 
that welfare is the closest synonym for ‘the good of man’. Ac-
cordingly, to state what the good of man consists in, is, in von 
Wright’s view, to state what the welfare of man consists in. 
But since well-being comprises the basic prerequisites of the 
good of man, and since happiness forms the “crown” of wel-
fare, well-being and happiness seem to form two complemen-
                                               
8 See, however, also Baier’s critical comments on this argument (1989, 
234–235). 
9 The upshot of connecting welfare with utilitarian concepts is that the 
considerations of welfare (unlike considerations of a being’s happiness) 
include a causal component: considerations of welfare are considerations 
of how some things (causally) promote some being’s good.  
10 See, however, VoG, 108, which does not seem to fit well with this gen-
eral picture of the conceptual interrelations between welfare and well-
being. 
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tary aspects or dimensions of welfare, i.e. of the good of 
man.11 
One can perhaps see better the relationships between the 
concepts of welfare, well-being, happiness and the good of 
man, as suggested by von Wright in The Varieties of Goodness, 
if we map the concepts in a diagram: 
 
 
Diagram 1: The Good of Man – a preliminary account 
 
All that has been presented above is based on what von 
Wright says in his preliminary discussion in the first part of 
chapter V. The account suggested is quite illuminating, and I 
think that this sort of perspective might indeed be adopted. 
For it would allow one to give an account of the concept of 
‘the good of man’, which would include both the objective 
dimension centred on the idea of basic human needs, and the 
subjective dimension of personal preferences. That is: this 
                                               
11 In Chapter III.12 (VoG, 62) von Wright in fact refers to two ‘levels’ of 
welfare and calls them “privative” and “positive” aspects of welfare: the 
first, basic aspect, consisting of fulfilment of basic needs and wants of 
man, the latter being connected with the hedonic aspects of enjoying one’s 
life. In Chapter V these ‘aspects’ seem to be covered by well-being and 
happiness, which together make up the more complex notion of human 
welfare. 
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kind of two-dimensional account would allow for a fairly 
universal basis of human welfare, and would still leave room 
for subjective variation in the pursuit of personal happiness.  
 
5. However, and interestingly, von Wright does not seem to 
follow this path further in the Varieties. His official and more 
detailed doctrine of welfare, as presented in sections 8–14 of 
chapter V, rather bears close resemblance to the subjectivist 
and hedonic account of happiness, as presented in sections 2–
7. In this account von Wright seems, as it were, to downplay 
what we called the “basic” dimension of human welfare 
above – the dimension of well-being – and to suggest a posi-
tion according to which each individual subject is the final 
judge in defining what the ultimate constituents of her wel-
fare are. In fact, one can detect a certain discrepancy between 
the two approaches in the Varieties: the one sketched in Chap-
ters III.6, III.12 and V.1 on the one hand (i.e. in the general 
discussion on the concept of ‘the good of a being’ and in the 
introductory section on ‘the good of man’), and the one sug-
gested in the later sections of Chapter V on the other. 
Whereas the first approach suggests a two-dimensional in-
terpretation of the concept of ‘the good of man’ (as sketched 
above), the latter revolves around the idea of the rational 
preference of an individual subject.12 Let us now have a closer 
look at the latter doctrine. 
What does it mean to claim that the individual subject is the 
final judge concerning the constituents of her welfare? The 
position, thus formulated, is open to a grave risk of obliterat-
ing completely a distinction between what in fact is good 
(beneficial) for somebody and what appears to be good for 
her. That is: if what is good for an agent A is dependent on 
the actual judgment of hers that this something is good for 
her, we seem to be unable to account for mistakes in the first 
person judgments concerning the content of the good of man. 
The judgments appear to be pure expressions of personal pref-
erence. If I (sincerely) claim that a bottle of wine (say, a good 
German Riesling) a day is good for me, then it simply is, and 
the matter is closed. But, as things stand: it very much makes 
sense to say that we sometimes in fact make mistakes in judg-
                                               
12  This discrepancy has been well noted by Thomas Schwarz (1989, 224). 
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ing whether something is good for us or not: later experience 
may indeed show that what we earlier thought was good for 
us, was, in fact, only an apparent good.  
Von Wright agrees that this is the case. In fact, much of the 
sophisticated discussion in sections 8–14 of Chapter V can be 
viewed as an attempt at articulating an ultimately subjectivist 
account of the first person judgments concerning the content 
of the good of man that is still compatible with the idea of 
making mistakes in these judgments. Von Wright illuminates 
his position by means of a “logical fiction” of an idealized 
situation of preferential choice. This kind of “logical fiction” 
consists of a counterfactual supposition of the subject’s per-
fect knowledge of all causal connections related to things and 
goals that she could want and pursue in her life. That is: the 
subject in the counterfactual position knows (i) what is re-
quired for attaining any goal (= its causal prerequisites), and 
(ii) what would follow from attaining any goal (= its causal 
consequences), and – perhaps most importantly – (iii) what 
kind of influence these causal prerequisites and consequences 
would have for her own welfare. In this kind of situation, the 
subject would, according to von Wright, be in the position of 
making a rational choice among all the alternative pursuable 
goals and things, and could choose the ones which, in fact, 
would be constitutive of her good. In this kind of counterfac-
tual situation there would, according to von Wright, in fact be 
no difference between the real and the apparent good. Thus, 
the good of man consists, according to von Wright’s position, 
in what an agent endowed with perfect causal knowledge 
would judge as being good for her. (VoG, 106–109.) 
It is easy to see how this refined subjectivist account makes 
room for mistakes in the first person judgments concerning 
the content of the good of man. At a given time, t, I judge that 
drinking a bottle of good dry Riesling a day is good for me. 
But I am (then) not aware of the detrimental social and pro-
fessional consequences this habit would later bring me, and 
that these consequences in turn would be harmful to my 
overall welfare. Being aware of these consequences later, I 
come to the conclusion that my earlier judgment was a mis-
take; in fact, had I known the consequences earlier at t, I 
would already (then) have revised my judgment concerning 
the beneficial nature of drinking a bottle of good dry Riesling 
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every day. The mistake is thus accounted for in terms of de-
fective causal knowledge. 
Since what is beneficial and harmful (i.e. the content of the 
good of man) is thus defined in terms of a counterfactual 
logical fiction of what a subject would prefer in an idealized 
situation, von Wright’s definition is independent of what sub-
jects actually prefer – but it remains subjective in the sense 
that the final content of the good of man is dependent on the 
preferences of the subject in question. (VoG, 108–109.)13 I 
think this point is of crucial importance for von Wright’s po-
sition in the Varieties. If I have understood his position cor-
rectly, when talking about this “logical fiction” of perfect 
knowledge of causal prerequisites and consequences of 
things pursued and of their combined relevance to the sub-
ject’s welfare, von Wright is not talking about an ideal subject 
in an idealized situation – about a constellation that would 
define the content of the good of man universally for every 
human being – but about an ordinary subject in an idealized 
situation. Thus the fiction is not meant to illuminate the uni-
versal and common Wertrationalität involved in choosing the 
ultimate goals to pursue in life. The good of each individual 
human being might, according to the position, in fact turn out 
to consist in different things. For von Wright, the good of 
man is, ultimately, the good of each individual man and 
woman. 
Despite the fact that von Wright resorts to what he calls a 
“logical fiction” in describing the subjective core of the judg-
ments concerning the content of the good of man, he is very 
aware that this fiction is just that – a fiction or a fantasy. The 
following quotation also neatly connects with the main topic 
of this volume – that of the human condition: 
It is a deeply impressive fact about the condition of man that it 
should be difficult, or even humanly impossible, to judge confi-
dently of many things which are known to affect our lives im-
portantly, whether they are good or bad for us. I think that 
becoming overwhelmed by this fact is one of the things which can 
incline a man towards taking a religious view of life. ‘Only god 
knows what is good or bad for us’. One could say thus – and yet 
                                               
13 For a clear statement of this position, see also von Wright 1989, 778–779. 
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accept that a man’s welfare is a subjective notion in the sense 
that it is determined by what he wants and shuns. (VoG, 110). 
To recapitulate: In the later sections of Chapter V of the Varie-
ties, von Wright gives a rationalized subjectivist account of 
the nature of judgments concerning the content of the good of 
man in terms of a “logical fiction” of perfect causal knowl-
edge. An important consequence of this, ultimately subjective 
account, is that von Wright does not tell his reader anything 
substantial about the content of human welfare. That is: he 
does not say on exactly what kind of things the good of man 
depends. At the time of writing Varieties of Goodness von 
Wright seems to have been quite convinced about the fact 
that each subject is – or even has to be – in the final analysis, 
the ultimate legislator and final judge of her own welfare. But 
whence this subjectivism, and what was its main motivation? 
 
6. Before looking at von Wright’s official doctrine of welfare, 
illustrated by the logical fiction of perfect causal knowledge 
(in 5 above), we learned (in 4 above) that in the first section of 
Chapter V von Wright mentions three close synonyms for the 
expression ‘the good of man’: well-being, happiness and wel-
fare. As we remember (see Diagram 1 above), von Wright also 
proposed that welfare is the most comprehensive notion of 
the three, comprising both well-being and happiness; the 
former being connected with the basic or lower level of wel-
fare (that is: human needs and health), the latter ‘the flower of 
welfare’, with hedonic concepts. 
It seems to me that the main flaw in von Wright’s analysis 
of human welfare in the later sections of the Chapter V, as 
described in section 5 above, is the lack of concern for the 
‘lower’ levels of human welfare – for the basic needs human 
beings have in order to live well. In fact, I think von Wright 
somewhat distorts the conceptual landscape in his attempt to 
reduce the whole field of human welfare to what a subject (be 
it idealized or not) wants, prefers, or aims at in her action. 
This may do for some aspects of welfare, but I do not think an 
account of this type is suitable for its lower and more basic 
aspect. 
It is possible that von Wright’s analysis here has been 
guided by a false analogy between the judgments concerning 
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the content of the good of man (judgments of the beneficial) 
and the judgments concerning happiness (eudaimonic judg-
ments).14 Since happiness admittedly (as von Wright points 
out in VoG, 99) is a hedonic concept with subjective over-
tones, and since von Wright’s analysis of human welfare is 
closely married to the analysis of happiness, also his account 
of human welfare bears a distinctive subjectivist flavour.15 
Both accounts put much weight on the first person authority 
(allegedly) involved in the eudaimonic judgments and the 
judgments of the beneficial. 
This close parallelism between the accounts of happiness 
and welfare is evident from the following two quotations. 
The first concerns happiness and stems from the Varieties, 
whereas the latter is on the good of man and is extracted from 
the correspondence between Georg Henrik von Wright and 
Elizabeth Anscombe.16  
 
On happiness:  
The fact that first person judgments of happiness can be insin-
cere must not be allowed to conflict logically with the fact that, 
whether a person is happy or not depends upon his own attitude 
to his circumstances of life. The supreme judge of the case must 
be the subject himself. To think that it could be otherwise is false 
objectivism. (VoG, 101–101). 
 
 
                                               
14’Eudaimonic judgment’ is a term used by von Wright in a somewhat 
technical sense. With this expression he simply means “a judgment to the 
effect that some being is happy or is not happy or is unhappy”. He is nei-
ther contrasting nor equating hedonic interpretation of happiness with a 
eudaimonic one. (VoG, 97.)  
15 And this is the case despite the fact that von Wright acknowledges that 
the two concepts belong to different logical categories (VoG, 87–88) and is 
careful to note that judgments of the beneficial contain a causal compo-
nent missing from eudaimonic judgments (e.g. VoG, 101).  
16 Von Wright had sent the manuscript of his Gifford Lectures, on which 
The Varieties of Goodness is based, to Elizabeth Anscombe in late 1962 or 
early 1963; and Anscombe had replied on 21 January 1963 with some criti-
cal comments on von Wright’s treatment of the ‘Golden Rule’. The quota-
tion is from von Wright’s extended reply to this letter. 
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On welfare & the good of man: 
A man may not know that a certain thing is bad for him and 
therefore tolerate or even want it. And another man may be able 
to enlighten the first (as regards the first man's own good) by 
pointing out to him existing causal connections and also by 
other means. But none of these possibilities must be allowed 
logically to conflict with the idea that every man is the supreme 
judge in questions relating to his own good, i.e. that the ultimate 
criterion of what is good or bad for a man is set by what he 
wants and shuns for himself. (…) 
This subjectivity of the notion of man’s good is essential to my 
view. I can see myself no honest alternative. If I am mistaken, it 
is a frightful mistake. And I cannot feel sure that I am not mis-
taken. (…) I think I can say truthfully that what I say in my book 
is meant very seriously. But the “detached” nature of philoso-
phic writing makes it terribly difficult to speak seriously. Also 
what I have just written seems to me very “academic” and 
humpty-dumpty.17 (von Wright to Elizabeth Anscombe, 2. Feb-
ruary 1963). 
One reason behind von Wright’s subjectivism seems thus to 
be the intimate juxtaposition of judgments of the beneficial 
with eudaimonic judgments. The only relevant logical differ-
ence between them seems to be that the former contain a 
causal component – which at the same time accounts for the 
possibility of mistakes in these judgments, as we saw in sec-
tion 5. But the quotations above also point to another source 
of motivation. The striking feature of these two quotations is, 
I think, not primarily that they contain astonishingly strong 
philosophical claims, but that they have a strong personal tone 
in them. Especially the latter quotation shows quite clearly 
how important – and even personal! – the issue of subjectiv-
ism was for von Wright at the time. It was, as it were, very 
important for him not to allow any third person or external 
authority to interfere with the personal valuations and prefer-
                                               
17 This particular reference to Humpty Dumpty, a character featured in 
English nursery-rhymes, is probably to the sixth chapter of Lewis Car-
roll’s Through the Looking-Glass (1872), in which Alice and the egg-shaped 
Humpty Dumpty talk, among other things, about the meanings of words. 
I am indebted to Lars Herzberg for pointing out this reference to me. 
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ences of a subject.18 Perhaps this kind of strong conceptual 
intuition of first person authority (or could one say, a liberal 
moral conviction?) also partly guided his analysis at the time 
of writing The Varieties of Goodness.19   
 
7. Let us now move on to have a brief look at how von 
Wright’s position takes a decisive turn in some writings from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Briefly put: this turn consists in 
the partial abandonment of the rationalized subjectivist posi-
tion of the Varieties in favour of a more objectivistic concep-
tion of human welfare. The ground for the change is prepared 
(at least) by a pair of critical essays by Thomas Schwartz and 
Kurt Baier, written in 1975 and 1974 respectively, but pub-
lished regrettably as late as in 1989 in the von Wright volume 
in the Library of Living Philosophers. In their contributions both 
Schwartz and Baier criticize von Wright’s subjectivist account 
of the good of man and of human welfare, suggesting (among 
other things) that the concept of welfare is intimately con-
nected with basic human needs.20 In his replies, written in 
1975 (but, again, not published until 1989), von Wright seems 
to accept some of the main points of criticism, but seems still 
committed to the subjective basis of judgments concerning 
                                               
18 For another statement, see VoG 93, where von Wright calls such an ex-
ternal interference “moralistic perversion”.  
19 It might be fruitful and interesting to connect von Wright’s insistence on 
subjectivism with his general remarks about conceptual analysis as expli-
cation of conceptual intuitions, which may end up changing or moulding 
the concepts we use (see von Wright 1989, 49). In his Intellectual Autobiog-
raphy, von Wright also notes his need to “make philosophy relevant to my 
life and my understanding of the world”, and suggests that The Varieties of 
Goodness may be viewed as an attempt in this direction (ibid., 18). Could 
one not view von Wright’s work on the good of man as an attempt at 
moulding a particular concept of human welfare around the fixed central 
idea of subjectivism?  
20 Schwartz 1989, 222–223 and Baier 1989, 238. Neither Schwartz nor Baier 
fail to notice that von Wright occasionally does connect welfare to the 
basic needs in the Varieties. They do, however, seem to fail to take fully 
into account that von Wright reserved the concept of well-being to the 
basic level of human needs, and that he suggested a two-level account of 
human welfare. 
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the content of the good of man.21 This, however, was soon to 
change. 
As is evident from the two passages from the 1960s quoted 
in section 6 above, the issue of subjectivism was quite central 
for von Wright, and his change of mind seems to have been 
gradual. Already in the early 1970s we find von Wright argu-
ing, in contexts related to philosophy of action, that subjects 
are not always the best judges concerning their own inten-
tions.22 Eventually, he was to connect such reflections with 
his earlier insistence on the first person authority of eudai-
monic judgments. As far as I know, the earliest explicit aban-
donment of the position informing his view on happiness and 
the good of man in The Varieties of Goodness appears in Free-
dom and Determination, written in 1977–1978. The passage in 
question deals primarily with the more general question of 
how one may establish what the agent’s intentions, reasons 
and motives for a particular action were, but it also contains 
an explicit reference to the lines, quoted above from the Varie-
ties, on the first person authority of eudaimonic judgments. 
After having argued, on the basis of some observations on 
self-deception and corruption of character, that the subject is 
not necessarily the final judge about her own reasons and mo-
tives of action, von Wright pauses and comments on his new 
position as follows (note again the personal tone of voice): 
This view differs from the one which I have professed in earlier 
writings [footnote reference to VoG, 101 quoted above; L.J.] 
when I have regarded it as a conceptual truth that the agent 
must be ‘supreme judge’ of his own case. It seemed to me then 
that to deny this would be to assume an unwarranted authority 
on the part of one man over another man’s ‘inner life’ – and it is 
only with reluctance that I now admit this need not be so. (von 
Wright 1980, 60–61). 
But what bearing does the abandonment of (the requirement 
of) subjectivism have on von Wright’s reflections on the good 
of man? It most definitely allowed him to approach the con-
tent of human welfare from a new point of view. But I think it 
                                               
21 See especially von Wright 1989, 774; 776; 780 and 796. For a slight revi-
sion of the schema of preferential choice, see ibid. 786–789.  
22 See, e.g. von Wright 1971, 114. 
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is fair to say he never quite spelled out his new approach in a 
well-articulated and extended form comparable with the so-
phistication of The Varieties of Goodness. Consequently, we 
have to gather the evidence from several scattered sources. In 
the early 1980s the new approach is exemplified by two arti-
cles: “Om Behov” (Engl. “On Need”) (1982) and “Rationality: 
Means and Ends” (1986, but first written in 1982). I think that 
these two pieces of philosophy together constitute the most 
important revision of von Wright’s earlier treatment of the 
good of man. The former article deals with the (neglected) 
lower level of human welfare, whereas the latter contains 
new reflections on the rationality of choosing ultimate goals 
to pursue in life. Due to the restrictions of space, I shall con-
fine myself to the main points of the former article.23  
“Om Behov” deals with the concept of need and thus ad-
dresses a dimension of human welfare that was insufficiently 
treated in the Varieties. (As we remember, in the Varieties von 
Wright did point out that human well-being is related to ful-
filment of basic human needs; but he did not really elaborate 
the idea further, nor did he have much to say on the concept 
of need in general.) Even though this is not stated with great 
emphasis, this article is clearly meant to be a supplement to 
and partial correction of the Varieties. In fact, von Wright 
starts the discussion by remarking that the concept of need 
has been a neglected topic in analytic philosophy and by 
paraphrasing what he calls his own earlier “definition” of 
need: “En varelse behöver sådant, som det är illa för den att 
undvara” – “The being needs that, the lack of which is bad for 
it” (1982, 1 = 1985, 152; my translation).24 The concept of need 
                                               
23 For a more extended discussion, the interested reader is advised to con-
sult Bernt Österman’s article “Att veta vad som är bra eller illa för en – 
Georg Henrik von Wright om värderationalitet” published in Ajatus 73, 
2017. 
24 In the 1982 paraphrase of his earlier “definition”, von Wright does not 
give a definite reference to the Varieties, but a similar definition appears 
on p. 108 of VoG: “The needed is that, the lack or loss of which is a bad 
thing, an evil.” It seems obvious to me that this is the definition von 
Wright is referring to. Interestingly, in VoG von Wright thinks that what is 
needed is primarily protective of somebody’s good, and thus good for, but 
not really beneficial to the subject (see also VoG, 43). In von Wright’s view, 
what is beneficial must actively promote the being’s good. It seems to me 
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is thus depicted – quite correctly – as a privative concept: what 
is needed is defined by a reference to that, the lack or loss of 
which is bad or harmful to a being. 
The focus on the privative concept of need seems to pave 
way for a more objectivist approach to the concept of ‘the 
good of man’. Without going much further into detail, let me 
just quote one passage where the new objectivist trend of von 
Wright’s thought is obvious. After quoting his earlier defini-
tion of need, von Wright proceeds to ask whether the concept 
of need is ultimately a subjective concept and whether it in-
troduces subjective valuations to discourse. He answers as 
follows: 
This kind of fear is groundless for many reasons. One reason is 
that the claim that a being is suffering, is, as I see it, not a value 
judgment. That somebody is suffering is objectively true or 
false, even though it may often be difficult to judge how things 
in fact are. The concept is vague – and we simply have to accept 
this. If more exact concepts are employed in science than the 
subject matter admits to, a distorted description of reality fol-
lows. Aristotle already warned us of such distortion. (Nico-
machean Ethics, I book, chapter 3). (von Wright 1985, 153; my 
translation).25  
The remainder of this short article contains a discussion of 
need on various levels of complexity, from the needs of 
plants via animal needs to the higher human needs.26 The 
                                                                                                           
that this particular way of analysing the concept of beneficial may have 
lead von Wright to downplay the significance of the concept of need in his 
(official) analysis human welfare: Since von Wright connects the concept 
of welfare closely with his analysis of the beneficial, and the beneficial 
concerns the promotion of the being’s good, the privative dimension of 
need seems to be left out of the analysis. Here it is also obvious that von 
Wright’s preliminary discussion on the good of man, as reconstructed in 4 
above, is partly incompatible with his refined doctrine: his official doc-
trine of welfare does not really seem to take the ‘privative dimension’ of 
the good of man into account, despite von Wright’s claim that he uses the 
term “welfare” synonymously with “the good of man”.  
25 For a similar reflection on the signs of human suffering in “Rationality: 
Means and Ends”, see von Wright 1985, 165. 
26 These sections of the paper bear a distinctive Aristotelian flavour – but 
also, I think, simultaneously develop further von Wright’s earlier idea 
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article also concerns the relationship of needs to the concept 
of health and well-being, the contrast between natural and 
artificial needs, and it touches upon the generation of false 
needs in modern societies, characterized by the growing im-
balance between generated wants and natural needs. Fur-
thermore, it includes a short sketch of how the concept of 
need may be used in criticizing repressive societal norms.  
By focusing on the concept of need and on the (previously 
neglected) concept of well-being, von Wright seems to be in 
search of an approach to human welfare that would admit of 
some objective dimensions. This objective dimension is to be 
found in natural (and necessary?) needs of living beings. 
From the perspective of von Wright’s earlier treatment of the 
good of man, one interesting novelty of this approach is that 
it enables him to say something quite substantial about the 
content of the (lower level) of the good of man – something 
he, I should like to say, absolutely refrained from doing in his 
earlier analysis. After having already mentioned some basic 
needs of shelter and nutrition that humans share with ani-
mals (and to a lesser degree with plants), he comes to specific 
human needs – and simply provides his reader with a list: 
What, then, are the specific human needs? Loving and safe envi-
ronment, especially in childhood and during the formative 
years; introduction to life in the human community to which the 
person naturally belongs; opportunities to receive and give ex-
pressions of friendship and tenderness. This is what a human 
being needs in addition to the satisfaction of the animal needs. 
But these ‘higher’ needs are also anchored in the ‘animal’ basis. 
We encounter them in rudimentary forms in the animal world. 
The exclusively human seems to be contained only in those 
complex relations that are the consequence of man being a 
speaking creature (…) and has thus, alone in the animal world, 
developed forms of life that we call culture. (von Wright 1985, 
                                                                                                           
that ‘the good of a being’ is a biological concept in a broad sense: all living 
beings have some basic needs, and the needs of different beings are close-
ly related to what kind of functions the kinds of living beings can per-
form. The needs of plants, animals and human beings form a hierarchical 
order – and this hierarchy, in turn, is analogous the hierarchy of functions 
the creatures can perform. 
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167; my translation; for a similar passage in “Rationality: Means 
and Ends” see ibid. 183–184). 
8. Let us now come back to where we started our philosophi-
cal journey into von Wright’s reflections on the good of man. 
As we remember, at the very beginning of the chapter on the 
good of man in the Varieties, von Wright stated that  
 
The notion of the good of man (…) is the central notion of our 
whole inquiry. The problems connected with it are of the utmost 
difficulty. Many things which I say about them may well be 
wrong. Perhaps the best I can hope for is that what I say will be 
interesting enough to be worth a refutation. (VoG, 86).  
Now it seems quite obvious that in von Wright’s post-
Varieties thinking on morals and ethics the concept of ‘the 
good of man’ remains the very central notion. It also seems 
clear that he in fact subjected his earlier approach to criticism 
– to criticism, which, however, is more often implicit than 
explicit. But this critique does not amount to a complete refu-
tation. Surely, the abandonment of the requirement of the 
ultimate subjective basis of first person judgments concerning 
the content of human welfare was a crucial change. But still, 
it seems to me, the later developments in his thinking rather 
enrich than completely replace the somewhat one-sided 
analysis given in the Varieties. As I have suggested, his mis-
take was that the examination of human welfare was too 
closely married to the account of the hedonic concept of hap-
piness. But, to be just to von Wright’s earlier reflections, the 
idea of an objective basis of human welfare in the basic needs 
and wants was already there – and this was designated by the 
(then insufficiently treated) concept of well-being. The con-
ceptual pieces were already there, but they needed to wait for 
some 20 years to be put together. 
What I have said above about the later development of von 
Wright’s position is preliminary and simplifying, and the 
topic merits further research. However, the ideas and insights 
discussed here from the historical perspective of von Wright’s 
intellectual development are quite important and illuminat-
ing. As already stated at the end of section 4 above, the insis-
tence on the objective basis of human welfare in fulfilment of 
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basic human needs (= level of human well-being) is perfectly 
compatible with the idea of (subjective) variation in the 
higher levels of human welfare and with the pursuit of per-
sonal happiness. And in fact there is much to recommend in 
this picture. To work this position out in further detail would, 
of course, require one to revisit, reformulate and even to 
abandon some of the more detailed things von Wright has to 
say in The Varieties of Goodness.  
 
9. To conclude this essay, I should like to connect the issues 
discussed above with another topic of interest in von 
Wright’s intellectual biography – and thus also to the very 
topic of this publication: humanism. In the eponymous essay 
published in von Wright’s 1978 collection Humanismen som 
livshållning (Finnish translation Humanismi elämänasenteena 
1981; Engl. “Humanism as an attitude of life”) von Wright 
characterizes humanism as an intellectual attitude to the 
problems of life – an attitude which is defined by concern for 
the good or the best of man. (von Wright 1981, 151–152, 166).  
As we can see, the concept so central in von Wright’s ap-
proach to moral philosophy – the good of man – was, for him, 
also the concept defining humanism. This allows us, I think, 
to characterize von Wright’s search for the good of man as a 
search for a genuinely humanistic approach to ethics and to 
the moral life of man – a kind of perspective on ethics which 
makes reference neither to the transcendent realities nor to 
the universal moral laws of human thought, but finds its fo-
cus in the idea of the suffering and striving human being and 
in the idea of the human condition in the ever-changing 
world. 
As friends of his writings well know, the idea of human-
ism and concern for the human condition were ever-
important themes for von Wright. In his Intellectual Autobiog-
raphy, written in the mid 1970s for his Library of Living Phi-
losophers volume, von Wright describes his long-standing 
personal interest in humanism. He divides his humanistic 
approach to life into various stages: He speaks of the Burck-
hardtian “aesthetic humanism” of his youth, which was to be 
replaced by the “ethical humanism” of the 1950s and 1960s, 
which again was to develop further into “social humanism” 
in the 1970’s. Now, it seems to me that we can detect a paral-
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lel development in von Wright’s ethical convictions and, in 
particular, in his ideas on the good of man. The subjective but 
rationalized conception of the Varieties, with its insistence on 
the subjective basis of judgments concerning human happi-
ness and welfare, reflects the attitude he calls “ethical human-
ism”; an attitude which still remained, as he himself put it, 
“decidedly self-centered and individualistic”, and in the light 
of which the problems of life were “the problems of ‘hiin En-
kelte’”, as von Wright quotes Kierkegaard’s words. (von 
Wright 1989, 18). Perhaps this connection between von 
Wright’s value-theoretical reflections and his humanistic 
Weltanschauung also helps us understand why the issue of 
subjectivism was so important and personal for him at the 
time. But this, as we have seen, was to change. And the 
change towards the objective dimensions of human welfare 
in the 1980s was not the final stop. Some fairly late and short 
writings of the 1990s were to connect the good of man more 
intimately with ideas of social identity.27 To trace our phi-
losopher’s path further is, however, a task for another occa-
sion. 
 
University of Helsinki 
 
References 
Baier, K. (1989), “Preference and the Good of Man”, in P. A. Schilpp, P. A. 
and L. E. Hahn (ed.) (1989), 233–270. 
Carroll, L (1872), Through the Looking-Glass and what Alice found there, 
Macmillan & co., London. 
Hämäläinen, N., Lemetti, J. and Niiniluoto, I. (ed.) (2014), Hyve, Filosofisia 
tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta 45. 
Jakola, L. (2014), “Hyvän muunnelmat, analyysin muunnelmat: G. H. von 
Wright moraalisen hyvän luonteesta”, in N. Hämäläinen et al. (ed.) 
(2014), 107–122. 
Schilpp, P. A. and Hahn, L. E. (ed.) (1989), The Philosophy of Georg Henrik 
von Wright, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. 
Schwartz, Th. (1989), “Von Wright’s Theory of Human Welfare: A Cri-
tique”, in P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn (ed.) (1989), 217–231. 
                                               
27 See von Wright 2006. 
290   Lassi Jakola 
 
von Wright, G. H. (1963), The Varieties of Goodness (=VoG), Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London.  
von Wright, G. H. (1971), Explanation and Understanding, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, Ithaca, New York. 
von Wright, G. H. (1980), Freedom and Determination, Acta Philosophica Fen-
nica 31, No. 1. 
von Wright, G. H. (1981), Humanismi elämänasenteena, Otava, Keuruu. 
von Wright, G. H. (1982), “Om Behov”, Filosofisk Tidskrift 3, 1–12. Finnish 
translation “Tarpeesta” published in Ajatus 41 (1984) and again in von 
Wright (1985), 152–168. 
von Wright, G. H. (1985), Filosofisia tutkielmia, Kirjayhtymä, Helsinki. 
von Wright, G. H. (1986), “Rationality: Means and Ends”, Epistemologia 9, 
57–71. (First published as Finnish translation “Keinojen ja päämäärien 
rationaalisuudesta” in von Wright (1985), 169–188.) 
von Wright, G. H. (1989), “Intellectual Autobiography” and “A Reply to 
My Critics”, in P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn (ed.) (1989), 3–55 and 731–
888. 
von Wright, G. H. (2006), “Moderni identiteetti ja eettisyys”, Ajatus 63. 
von Wright, G. H. and Anscombe, E., The scientific correspondence be-
tween G. H. von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe. Collection of the 
Finnish National Library, COLL. 714, National Library, University of 
Helsinki. 
Wiggins, D. (2009), “What is the Order Among the Varieties of Goodness? 
A Question Posed by von Wright; and a Conjecture Made by Aris-
totle”, Philosophy 87, 175–200. 
Österman, B. (2017), “Att veta vad som är bra eller illa för en – Georg 
Henrik von Wright om värderationalitet”, Ajatus 73, 65–89. 
